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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Thomas J. Capano appeals from an order entered in the 
district court on June 27, 1997, holding that he waived the 
attorney work product privilege with respect to certain 
documents he created which the United States seized from 
a third party pursuant to a subpoena.1  The district court 
had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction to review the order of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Cf. In re Grand Jury, 111 
F.3d 1066, 1073-77 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a denial of 
an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was 
a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to 
challenge the subpoena). 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In July 1996, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 
and a federal grand jury in Delaware began a kidnaping 
investigation into the disappearance of Anne Marie Fahey, 
who last was seen alive on June 27, 1996. Capano became 
the major target of these investigations. At the time of 
Fahey's disappearance, Capano, who is an attorney, was a 
partner in the Wilmington office of the Saul, Ewing, Remick 
& Saul law firm ("Saul Ewing"), a position he held until his 
resignation on May 31, 1997. 
 
On June 30, 1996, Capano retained attorneys after police 
officers notified him that they considered him a suspect in 
Fahey's disappearance. One of Capano's attorneys, Charles 
M. Oberly, III, directed him to prepare "a time-line of 
everything he could remember concerning his whereabouts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While the proceedings on this appeal originally were sealed, the 
district court on December 2, 1997, unsealed itsfile in this case. 
Accordingly, in response to our inquiry at oral argument, the parties 
agreed that we need not use ficticious names in our opinion. 
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on June 27, 1996 and immediately thereafter," and to 
"write down his thoughts and notes, as he remembered 
them, of anything he could recall about his relationship 
with Ms. Fahey." App. at 42. Following his attorney's 
instructions, Capano created a time-line and wrote down 
other notes regarding his relationship with Fahey and 
placed them in a legal file. 
 
Capano then put the file on a bookshelf in the office 
adjacent to his own office at Saul Ewing occupied by of one 
of his law partners, Timothy A. Frey, because he was 
concerned that there could be an unauthorized search of 
his own office leading to an unauthorized seizure of the file. 
Initially Frey was unaware that Capano placed thefile in 
his office; however, in August or September of 1996, 
Capano informed Frey about the location of the file. Within 
the next month, Frey found the file in his office, read it, 
and returned it to its prior location on his bookshelf. 
 
The file remained in Frey's office until the United States 
seized it on November 4, 1996. On that day, Assistant 
United States Attorney Colm F. Connolly telephoned Frey to 
inform him that an FBI agent would serve him with a grand 
jury subpoena for Capano's file. Frey then re-examined the 
file and determined that it was the same file he had 
examined previously. Connolly also telephoned the 
chairman of Saul Ewing, J. Clayton Undercofler, to notify 
him about the subpoena. Undercofler expressed a concern 
that the production of the file might reveal information 
relating to the law firm's representation of its clients. 
Connolly and Undercofler then agreed that thefile would be 
produced under seal, and that the law firm would have an 
opportunity to screen the file for any confidential 
information. 
 
After these phone calls, FBI Special Agent Kevin Shannon 
arrived at Frey's office and served the subpoena. The file 
was placed in an envelope, sealed, and delivered to 
Assistant United States Attorney Patricia Hannigan, who 
had been "walled off " from the investigation to avoid any 
possibility of taint. On November 5, 1996, Hannigan met 
with Undercofler and Saul Ewing's executive partner, 
Frederick D. Strober. After unsealing the envelope, the two 
attorneys from Saul Ewing examined the file and 
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determined that it did not contain any information relating 
to the law firm's representation of its clients. Hannigan 
then examined the file and determined that nothing in it 
arguably was privileged or protected. She then made a copy 
of the file which she gave to Connolly. She, however, 
retained the original file. 
 
Although the parties dispute exactly when Capano 
learned of the seizure, they agree that Capano and his 
attorneys did not know that the government intended to 
seize the file prior to the service of the subpoena and that 
they were informed of the seizure only after it had occurred. 
Capano asserts that his attorney first learned of the 
disclosure on November 6, 1996, two days after the seizure. 
See br. at 27. In any event, on November 12, 1996, one of 
Capano's attorneys, Bartholomew J. Dalton, sent a letter to 
the United States Attorney advising the government that 
the file contained privileged information. The United States, 
through Connolly, responded on November 26, 1996, by 
telephone and informed Dalton that the United States did 
not believe that the attorney-client privilege or the attorney 
work product doctrine protected the materials contained in 
the file. Connolly told him to "take the issue up with the 
Court." App. at 138. 
 
On at least two occasions between December 30, 1996, 
and February 1997, Connolly also had telephone 
discussions with Oberly regarding the applicability of the 
attorney work product and the attorney-client privileges to 
the seized documents. In a second letter to the United 
States dated January 22, 1997, Oberly requested that the 
government either return the documents in the file or send 
him a letter stating its opposition to the assertion of the 
privileges. In response, Connolly formally denied the 
production request in a letter dated February 25, 1997, 
contending that the documents were not privileged and 
that, in any event, Capano waived any privilege when he 
placed them in Frey's office. Finally, on March 14, 1997, 
Capano, citing both the attorney-client and the attorney 
work product privileges, filed a motion in the district court 
seeking an order compelling the government to return the 
file. 
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In a memorandum opinion dated June 27, 1997, the 
district court denied Capano's motion. While the district 
court held that the attorney-client privilege did not offer 
any protection to the file, it nevertheless held that the file 
was attorney work product, because Capano acted as his 
attorney's agent in creating the file in preparation of 
litigation. However, the district court determined that 
Capano waived this work product protection based on both 
disclosure and timeliness grounds. In particular, because 
Capano had revealed the presence of the file to Frey and 
had stored it in Frey's unlocked and easily accessible office, 
the district court held that Capano disregarded the risk 
that an adversary might obtain the file, and thus had 
waived the work product privilege. Alternatively, the district 
court held that Capano waived the work product privilege 
by waiting nearly four months to file a motion to compel the 
return of the seized materials. Finally, the district court 
noted in a footnote in its opinion that even if Capano did 
not waive the attorney work product protection of the file, 
the United States had demonstrated sufficient cause to 
overcome that protection. 
 
Capano filed a timely appeal to this court on July 7, 
1997. Neither party has challenged the district court's 
holdings regarding the applicability of the attorney-client or 
the attorney work product privileges; therefore, we accept 
its determination that the seized file was attorney work 
product, but was not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. Because we will affirm the district court's holding 
that Capano waived his attorney work product privilege 
with regard to the seized file based on his delay in seeking 
a judicial determination, we do not determine whether 
Capano waived the privilege by disclosing the documents. 
Nor do we decide whether the United States demonstrated 
sufficient cause to overcome the work product protection. 
 
III. WAIVER OF THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION 
 
In examining the district court's holding that Capano 
waived his work product privilege, we use an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. Cf. Livingstone v. North Belle 
Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 524 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. 
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denied, 117 S.Ct. 1311 (1997) (using an abuse of discretion 
standard to review a waiver of an attorney-client privilege).2 
 
The work-product doctrine, first recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 
S.Ct. 385 (1947), "shelters the mental processes of the 
attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can 
analyze and prepare his client's case." United States v. 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170 (1975). The 
privilege thus promotes the adversarial system by 
protecting the confidential nature of materials prepared by 
attorneys in anticipation of litigation and "enabl[es] 
attorneys to prepare cases without fear that their work 
product will be used against their clients." Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 
1428 (3d Cir. 1991). This protection also can extend to 
materials prepared by an attorney's agent, if that agent acts 
at the attorney's direction in creating such documents. See 
Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. at 2170. 
 
The attorney work product privilege, however, is not 
absolute, and it may be waived. See id. at 239, 95 S.Ct. at 
2170. Thus, we have held that a party may waive the 
attorney work product privilege by disclosing protected 
documents in certain circumstances. See Westinghouse, 
951 F.2d at 1428-29. It has been held that a disclosure 
sufficient to waive the work product protection does not 
have to be intentional; therefore inadvertent or 
unintentional disclosures of protected materials also might 
result in the waiver of the privilege. See, e.g., Carter v. 
Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990). However, 
such a disclosure does not automatically forfeit the 
attorney work product privilege. In determining whether a 
party has waived the privilege through an inadvertent or 
involuntary disclosure, courts consider, among other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Capano argues in his brief that we should exercise plenary review. Br. 
at 18-19. We disagree but observe that even exercising plenary review we 
would reach the same result. While we will assume without deciding that 
in some circumstances we would exercise plenary review to determine if 
the work product privilege had been waived, we think that it is 
appropriate to use an abuse of discretion standard here because the 
weighing of various considerations leads us to affirm the district court's 
order. 
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factors, the steps taken by a party to remedy the disclosure 
and any delay in doing so. See, e.g., United States v. 
Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa. 
1994); cf. United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749-50 
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant waived his 
attorney-client privilege with regards to a seized letter 
because he waited six months after the seizure to assert his 
privilege). But see Carter, 909 F.2d at 1451 (holding that 
even an inadvertent disclosure automatically waives the 
attorney work product privilege, because to do otherwise 
"would do no more than seal the bag from which the cat 
has already escaped."). Thus, in the case of inadvertent or 
involuntary disclosures, the party asserting the work 
product doctrine must pursue all reasonable means to 
restore the confidentiality of the materials and to prevent 
further disclosures within a reasonable period to continue 
to receive the protection of the privilege. 
 
It is undisputed that neither Capano nor his attorneys 
knew of the subpoena until after it had been issued and the 
file had been seized. Consequently, Capano had no 
opportunity to challenge the involuntary disclosure of the 
file by seeking to quash the subpoena; instead, his only 
remedy was to assert the attorney work product privilege 
after the United States took possession of the file. Capano 
clearly made a timely assertion of the attorney work 
product privilege to the government; his attorney mailed a 
letter asserting the privilege to the United States within 
eight days after the seizure. However, as of November 26, 
1996, Capano and his attorneys were on notice that the 
United States disagreed with the assertion of the privilege 
and would not relinquish the file voluntarily. In spite of this 
knowledge, Capano waited until March 14, 1997, tofile a 
motion to compel the return of the seized file. Thus, the 
determinative issue on this appeal is whether Capano's 
initial assertion of the privilege to the United States 
sufficiently protected his rights or whether his failure to 
seek a judicial ruling on the issue more promptly waived 
the privilege. 
 
We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion determining that even though Capano timely 
notified the United States of his claim of the privilege and 
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continued to assert it in subsequent communications, these 
assertions were insufficient to protect his rights. The United 
States was a direct adversary of Capano, and its continued 
use of the documents directly undermined the purpose of 
the attorney work product privilege of protecting 
confidential documents prepared in anticipation of litigation 
from a party's adversary. Capano's repeated admonitions to 
his adversary to return the protected documents did not 
prevent the continuing harm resulting from the disclosure. 
Judicial enforcement of the privilege was the only remedy 
that Capano could have obtained which would have 
foreclosed the United States from further use of the seized 
file. Without such judicial vindication, the United States 
was free to continue to utilize the documents, thereby 
negating their confidential character. 
 
In the case of such an involuntary disclosure, a 
reasonable person would not only inform his or her 
adversary of the breach of the privilege, but also would seek 
a judicial determination of the controversy if his or her 
adversary took an opposing stance. Merely asserting the 
privilege to an adversary is not sufficient to protect the 
privilege in these circumstances inasmuch as the adversary 
has possession of the materials claimed to be privileged and 
thus can make use of them. Moreover, if the district court 
countenanced Capano's delay in judicially asserting his 
privilege and then upheld his claim of privilege, the grand 
jury's use of the seized file potentially could have tainted its 
investigation.3 
 
In short, when a party's adversary has obtained 
possession of a party's work product and refuses to 
recognize the work product privilege, the party asserting the 
privilege must move expeditiously for relief particularly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In his brief Capano asserts that during the four months before he 
served his motion, the government had possession of the disputed 
documents and "is believed to have used these documents in the grand 
jury proceedings." Br. at 29. He reasons from this belief that there "was 
no prejudice to the Government as a result of the four-month period 
between [his] initial assertion of the . . . work product privilege[ ]" 
and 
the filing of his motion. Id. While the grand jury in fact did not indict 
Capano, clearly his argument overlooks the taint problem we have 
identified. 
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where, as here, the party asserting the privilege does not 
even claim that he had reason to believe that the 
adversarial party was not making use of the work product. 
Indeed, in his brief Capano asserts that in "this entire 
period," i.e., between November 12, 1996, and March 14, 
1997, when he filed his motion, the govenment "used these 
documents to further its grand jury investigation." Br. at 
15-16. While we cannot set an exact time within which 
such a motion must be made, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Capano 
waived the privilege as we are satisfied that Capano acted 
unreasonably in waiting nearly four months to seek a 
judicial vindication of his assertion of the privilege. 
 
Capano contends that SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997), supports his position that his assertion of the 
privilege to the United States sufficiently protected his 
rights. In Lavin, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC") sought to obtain copies of tape recordings of 
conversations between a husband and a wife. These 
recordings were made by and were in the possession of the 
husband's employer, Bankers Trust Company ("Bankers 
Trust"). See id. at 924. Initially, Bankers Trust had 
submitted these tapes to the Federal Reserve Board 
("Board") as part of a production request pursuant to the 
Board's examination powers. When Bankers Trust notified 
Lavin, the husband, that it had relinquished the tapes to 
the Board, he immediately asserted his marital 
communications privilege and requested that Bankers Trust 
assert it on his behalf to the Board. Bankers Trust and 
Lavin subsequently entered into an agreement whereby 
Bankers Trust would give him the opportunity to challenge 
any further requests seeking the release of the tapes. 
However, Lavin did not institute any legal proceedings 
against Bankers Trust to obtain the tapes. Subsequently, 
the SEC sought the disclosure of the tapes, and Lavin 
asserted his marital communications privilege. 
 
In considering whether the privilege had been waived, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that Lavin had no obligation to initiate any legal 
proceedings against Bankers Trust to protect the 
conversations "absent a concrete threat of further 
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disclosure." Id. at 931. There was no such threat in Lavin's 
case, because Bankers Trust continued to abide by its 
agreement. In fact, Lavin had intervened successfully in an 
unrelated civil suit to assert his marital communications 
privilege with respect to the tapes. See id. at 924-25, 931. 
The court also noted that "taking reasonable precautions to 
preserve the confidentiality of privileged materials does not 
require gaining physical possession in cases such as this 
where . . . attempts to gain such possession would have 
been futile because the tapes were not the property of 
[Lavin]." Id. at 932. Thus, Capano argues that like Lavin, he 
should not have been forced to seek an immediate judicial 
determination regarding the return of his file, because the 
disclosure already had occurred and no threat of future 
disclosures existed. 
 
Aside from the obvious differences in the privileges at 
issue and the purposes behind them, the facts of Lavin 
differ substantially from the present case. In Lavin, Lavin 
took active measures to assure that no one beyond the 
owner of the recordings, Bankers Trust, had access to 
them. More importantly, Lavin took legal action against any 
potential adversary that sought to obtain the recordings, 
and the entity in possession of the tapes, Bankers Trust, 
was not such an adversary. Capano was in a more difficult 
position than Lavin, because the privilege already had been 
breached by the seizure, and his adversary already had 
access to the documents. Thus, unlike Lavin, Capano was 
harmed immediately by the initial disclosure as it was to 
his direct adversary and not to a third party. Repeated 
communications by Capano asserting the privilege to his 
adversary were insufficient to prevent further harm; only 
timely intervention by a court could accomplish that 
objective. 
 
Therefore, we reiterate that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that Capano waived his 
attorney work product privilege with regard to the seized 
documents by failing to file a timely motion to compel their 
return. Within a few weeks after the seizure of thefile, 
Capano was on notice both of the seizure and of the 
government's unwillingness to recognize his attorney work 
product privilege with regard to the seized file. Yet, he 
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waited nearly four months to seek a judicial vindication of 
his claim of privilege. This delay is inconsistent with the 
purpose behind the attorney work product privilege, and 
thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that Capano's delay waived the privilege. 
 
In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the order of June 
27, 1997. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I concur with the holding of the majority. I write 
separately for two reasons. First, I think that we should 
reject the assertion that the government has established 
"good cause" to overcome the protection of the privilege. 
Second, I write because I believe that my colleagues' 
apparent concern for eliminating any taint from this 




The government argues that "[its] need for the file results 
from [Capano's] refusal to testify before the grand jury and 
speak with investigators. The Government attempted to 
secure [Capano's] testimony, but its efforts failed." 
Appellant's Br. at 23. This amounts to nothing more than 
an assertion that failure to waive the privilege against self- 
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment gives the 
government the right to obtain information that would 
otherwise be protected as work product because it allows 
the government to establish the "good cause" needed to 
defeat that privilege. Surely, one need not waive the 
protections embedded in the Fifth Amendment in order to 
preserve a work product privilege. 
 
We have historically been quite reluctant to find the good 
cause needed to overcome the protections of the work 
product doctrine. See In re Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 282 (3d 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Armerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 
980 (3d Cir. 1985); and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979). We should not be reluctant to 
reject the government's claim of "good cause" insofar as it 
is based upon the argument that assertion of a 




My colleagues note that "if the district court 
countenanced Capano's delay in judicially asserting his 
privilege and then upheld his claim of privilege, the grand 
jury's use of the seized file potentially could have tainted its 
investigation." Maj. Op. at 8. This may well be true, but is 
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irrelevant. The government risked tainting the investigation 
when it decided to proceed in the manner that it did. The 
circumstances here are unique. There is no reason that has 
been pointed out to this court why the government could 
not have sought to have Saul Ewing secure the Capano file, 
and then notified Capano of the government's intent to 
subpoena it. The district court could then have decided the 
motion to quash that Capano would most certainly have 
filed, and there would have been no possibility of taint prior 
to an adjudication of the privilege. The government was 
obviously aware of the problems it was creating by seizing 
the documents and setting up a "Chinese wall" in an 
attempt to insulate them. Because the Government chose 
that tactic, we ought not to allow a concern for any taint 
that the seizure may have created to affect our analysis of 
the claim of privilege. "The ultimate aim [of the work 
product privilege doctrine] is to promote the proper 
administration of justice." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d. Cir. 1979). That objective is not well 
served if we allow a possible taint that the government itself 
created to influence our inquiry.1 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There is no suggestion that Capano deliberately delayed filing a motion 
to secure an advantage. Where a defendant or target does that, I agree 
that consideration of taint may be appropriate. 
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